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JURISDICTION 
Original appellate jurisdiction over the Judgment entered by 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, Utah 
is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989 Supp.)* The Supreme Court has elected, 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-2-2(4) (1989 Supp.), to 
transfer this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Therefore, 
jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1989 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
As a preface to its responses to the three issues raised on 
appeal by Defendant St. Joseph High School Board of Financial 
Trustees ("Defendant"), Plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin and Robbins 
Construction Company ("Plaintiff") has raised two additional 
issues which are dispositive of the appeal without reaching its 
merits: 
1. Whether the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over 
the appeal because of Defendant's failure to file a Notice of 
Appeal within the time provided by law; and 
2. Whether the appeal is barred by Defendant's 
voluntary payment of the Judgment amount and the execution of 
a Satisfaction of Judgment which does not preserve any part 
of the appeal. 
Defendant's issues presented on appeal are not restated here 
but are responded to in Points 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The present case is a contract 
action by Plaintiff against Defendant on a written "cost plus" 
contract for the remodeling of St. Joseph's Gymnasium and the 
addition of a library. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant had failed 
to pay approximately $30,000.00 of construction costs and 
contractor fees. 
Defendant counterclaimed against Plaintiff for construction 
delay damages and for damages relating to the fact that actual 
construction costs exceeded the architect's estimate. 
B. Course of Proceeding. The case was tried to a jury in 
the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, Utah, the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding, from December 3 to December 
8, 1987. Plaintiff specifically objects to the characterization 
of the proceedings below as contained in Defendant's Brief (pages 
3-4). However, facts relating to the course of proceedings have 
been included only to the extent that they are relevant to the 
issues on appeal. Such facts are incorporated in the individual 
sections of Plaintiff's Brief as applicable. 
C. Disposition of the Court Below. On December 8, 1987 the 
jury returned a Special Verdict awarding Plaintiff a Judgment of 
$19,584.01. The jury also by Special Verdict found that Plaintiff 
owed Defendant nothing on its counterclaims. (Record pages 637-
639.) 
After the interest issue was briefed by counsel and argued to 
the Court, Judge Wahlquist granted interest of $6,350.18 and $6.40 
2 
per day thereafter until the Judgment was entered on February 1, 
1988. (Record pages 821-825.) 
Based on Plaintiff's Verified Memorandum of Costs and a 
hearing held thereon on March 23, 1988, Judge Wahlquist awarded 
costs in the amount of $232.75. (Record pages 895, 896.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff declines to give an independent statement of facts. 
All facts necessary to the disposition of the appeal are 
appropriately located in the Court's Findings of Fact (Record pages 
821-825.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's failure to file a timely Notice of Appeal presents 
an absolute jurisdictional bar to its appeal. 
POINT II 
By voluntarily paying the full amount of the Judgment, and 
executing a Satisfaction of Judgment, Defendant has acquiesced in 
and received the benefit of the Judgment and therefore is barred 
from appealing any portion of the same. 
POINT III 
The failure of the Lower Court to give Defendant's requested 
jury instructions relating to its counterclaim is not a valid basis 
for reversing the Lower Court's Judgment, because Defendant failed 
to object to the Lower Court's refusal to give instructions, the 
instructions were given in essence and the requested instructions 
even if given could not have benefited Defendant. 
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POINT IV 
The Lower Court's characterization of the architect as the 
agent of Defendant in the jury instructions was accurate. Even if 
it was inaccurate, it did not prejudice Defendant. 
POINT V 
The Lower Court's instruction regarding burden of proof is 
not a valid basis for appeal because Defendant failed to raise the 
issue at trial and the instruction as given correctly characterizes 
the law. 
POINT VI 
In light of the clear and obvious defects on appeal, Plaintiff 
is entitled to an award of damages and attorney's fees incurred in 
defending against this frivolous appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT APPEAL 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY FILE ITS NOTICE OF 
APPEAL. 
Defendant's Statement of the Case (Defendant's Brief, pp. 2-
4) omits several significant post-Judgment aspects of the present 
case. Most obviously absent is a statement of the date on which 
Judgment was entered by the Lower Court. Also absent is any 
reference to Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment 
which was filed, circulated to opposing counsel, argued, and 
granted on March 23, 1988. Defendant has good reason for deleting 
this information; a thorough review of the post-trial aspects of 
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the case conclusively demonstrates that Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial and Notice of Appeal were not timely filed and, therefore, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. 
A detailed account of the post-trial proceedings is necessary 
to demonstrate the jurisdictional defect. The following numbered 
paragraphs recite, in detail, pertinent post-trial proceedings. 
A multi-colored time line is included as Addendum 1 to clarify the 
chronology of events described. The time line depicts actions of 
the Lower Court in black, the Defendant in blue, and the Plaintiff 
in red. 
1. On December 8, 1987, the jury returned Special Verdicts 
which awarded the Plaintiff an amount of $19,584.01 on its claim 
and awarded nothing to Defendant on its counterclaim. 
2. On December 18, 1987, counsel for Plaintiff submitted 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment to the 
Lower Court after first delivering them to opposing counsel. The 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment were consistent with the Special 
verdicts returned by the jury. (Addendum 2) 
3. On January 4, 1988, counsel for Defendant filed a blanket 
objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
alleging that they were unsupported by the evidence. Defendant's 
Notice of Objection was filed well after the time to object had 
expired pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice for 
District and Circuit Courts in effect at that time. (Addendum 3) 
4. Simultaneous with its objections, Defendant filed its own 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Defendant's Findings and 
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Conclusions, inconsistent with the jury's Special Verdicts, 
purported to award Defendant $19,012.00 for delay damages and 
$83,970.30 for damages relating to the alleged cost overrun on the 
gymnasium. (Addendum 4) 
5. On January 20, 1988, the Lower Court scheduled and held 
a lengthy hearing on Defendant's objections to the proposed 
Findings and Conclusions. The Lower Court resolved all objections 
by specifying several changes to be made in the Findings (the 
majority of changes related to interest calculations) and finding 
the remainder of Findings and all Conclusions to be adequate. 
6. In Judge Wahlquist's ruling on Defendant's subsequent 
Motion for New Trial, he stated, "After verdict, the lawyers 
disputed over what the Court's Findings of Fact, etc., should be. 
A lengthy hearing was held. All rulings were made in open court 
in the presence of counsel. Everyone knew what the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were to say before they were finally 
drafted." (Addendum 5) 
7. One day later, on January 21, 1988, counsel for Plaintiff 
drafted new Findings of Fact incorporating the revisions announced 
by the Court. The revised Findings, along with the approved 
Conclusions of Law, were mailed to Judge Wahlquist with a cover 
letter requesting that he enter the same if no objection was 
received from Defendant's counsel within the period provided by the 
Rules of Practice. Copies of the Findings and Conclusions were 
hand delivered to Defendant's counsel on that same date with a copy 
of the cover letter sent to Judge Wahlquist. 
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8. Once again Defendant's counsel objected to the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Defendant's Notice of Objection 
was hand-delivered to Plaintiff's counsel on January 28, 1988 and 
was mailed to the Lower Court in Ogden, arriving after the 
expiration of the time for objections. (Addendum 6) 
9. Defendant's second set of objections, like its first set 
of objections, allege that the Findings and Conclusions were 
unsupported by the evidence. On that basis, the Defendant objected 
to (1) the majority of the Findings that the Lower Court had 
approved on January 20, 1988 as originally drafted; (2) objected 
to the specific Findings announced by Judge Wahlquist in open court 
on January 20, 1988; and (3) objected to the Conclusions of Law 
which were identical to those originally submitted to the Lower 
Court and approved on January 20, 1988. 
10. On February 1, 1988, Judge Wahlquist signed the proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and entered them 
in accordance with Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judge Wahlquist noted on the Judgment that the issue of costs be 
reserved. (Addendum 7) 
11. On March 2, 1988, Plaintiff commenced execution on the 
Judgment by causing the Lower Court to issue a Writ of Garnishment 
against First Security Bank on March 2, 1988. 
12. Plaintiff provided Defendant with a Notice of Entry of 
Judgment on March 7, 1988. (Addendum 8) 
13. On March 23, 1988, at a hearing scheduled for the purpose 
of taxing costs, Defendant's counsel submitted a Rule 60 Motion for 
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Relief from Judgment, unaccompanied by supporting memoranda, to the 
Lower Court and to counsel for Plaintiff. (Addendum 9) 
14. Without prior notice, Defendant's counsel proceeded to 
argue that counsel for Plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct 
for failure to provide Notice of Entry of Judgment to Defendant 
until the time for appeal had expired. Defendant's counsel argued, 
on that basis, that the Judgment should be set aside and reentered 
to allow Defendant an opportunity to file a Motion for New Trial 
or Notice of Appeal. (Record at 888-890) 
15. Over Plaintiff's objection, Judge Wahlquist ordered that 
the Judgment be "re-entered" as of March 23, 1988, "for the 
purposes of post-trial motions and notice of appeal." (Addendum 
10) 
16. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
signed on February 1, 1988 were not modified nor affected by the 
Lower Court's order granting Defendant relief from Judgment. 
17. On April 1, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial 
which Judge Wahlquist subsequently denied on April 25, 1989 
(Defendant's Brief, page 4.) 
18. Subsequent to the Lower Court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 2, 
1989. (Record at 949.) 
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A. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL, 
OR OTHER POST-TRIAL MOTION WHICH WOULD HAVE TOLLED 
THE TIME FOR FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL, WITHIN 
THIRTY (3 0) DAYS OF THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON0 
FEBRUARY 1, 1988. 
The Judgment entered on February 1, 1988, was valid in all 
aspects. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a proposed 
Judgment were duly served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the Lower Court for signature in compliance with Rule 
2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice for District and Circuit Courts. 
Even though Defendant's objection was untimely under Rule 2.91, the 
Lower Court afforded Defendant a full opportunity to be heard in 
the hearing of January 20, 1988. The Findings and Conclusions, 
revised according to the Lower Court's instruction, were then again 
served on Defendant's counsel before submission to the Lower Court. 
When no objection had been received by the Lower Court during 
eleven (11) days following service of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment on Defendant's counsel, the Lower Court signed and entered 
the Judgment. Under these facts, Defendant may not now complain 
that the Judgment was not properly filed and entered within the 
meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co.. 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986). 
xRule 2.9(b): Copies of the proposed findings, judgment, 
and/or orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to the 
court and counsel within five (5) days after service. (Rule 2.9 
has been replaced by Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration without change in text). 
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Even had Defendants second set of objections been timely 
filed, they would have had no effect on the finality of the 
Judgment, The Defendant's second set of objections, which were 
for practical purposes identical to the first set of objections, 
are barred by the "law of the case". Defendant's objection that 
the Findings and Conclusions were not supported by the evidence 
adduced at trial had been previously raised and argued before the 
Lower Court and decided. 
There must be finality, a time when the case in the 
trial court is really over and the loser must appeal or 
give up. Successive post-judgment motions interfere with 
that policy and justice is not served by permitting the 
losing party to string out his attack on a judgment over 
a period of months, one argument at a time, or to make 
the first motion a rehearsal for the real thing the next 
month. 
Sears v. Sears, 422 N.E. 2d 610, 611 (111. 1981), cited with 
approval in Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 
969 (Utah App. 1989). See also Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.f 
572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); Conder v. A.L. Williams & 
Associates. Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah App. 1987). 
The record unequivocally reflects that Defendant failed to 
file a Notice of Appeal or any other post-trial motion within the 
allotted thirty (3 0) days following the February 1, 1988, Entry of 
Judgment. By referring to the time line at Addendum 1, it is clear 
that Defendant failed to file any motion whatsoever until March 23, 
1988, approximately fifty (50) days after the Entry of Judgment. 
Further, it is clear that Defendants 60(b) Motion filed on March 
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23 would not interrupt the running of the time for appeal even had 
it been filed during the allotted time for appeal. 
A 60(b) motion does not extend or toll the thirty day 
period within which appeals in the original action must 
be filed. See Rules of Utah Supreme Court 4(b). 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). Therefore, the 
first post-Judgment motion filed by Defendant which conceivably 
could have had an effect on the Judgment was its Motion for New 
Trial dated April 1, 1988, approximately 60 days after the Entry 
of Judgment. 
Defendant's failure to file a Notice of Appeal or a post-trial 
Motion which would suspend or toll the running of the time for 
appeal2 is fatal to the appeal. Failure to file within the 30 days 
provided in Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court strips 
the court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 
652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); 
In Re Estate of Ratliff, 431 P.2d 571 (Utah 1967). The Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals are specifically 
precluded from extending the time for appeal by Rule 22(b) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and Rule 22(b) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, respectively: 
2Rule 4(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court lists only 
4 post-trial motions which will suspend the running of the 30 day 
period: 
1. Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict; 
2. Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend or Make Additional Findings; 
3. Rule 59(b) Motion for a New Trial; and 
4. Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. 
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(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause shown 
may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by these 
rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit 
any act to be done after the expiration of such time, but 
the court may not enlarge the time for filing a Notice 
of Appeal . . . except as specifically authorized by law. 
. . . (emphasis added) 
It is apparent from the face of the record that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. An inquiry of jurisdictional 
scope is appropriately raised at any point in the proceeding. The 
issue of jurisdiction may be raised by either party or by the Court 
sua sponte when it appears on the face of the record. Albertson 
v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); Neider v. State, 665 P.2d 1306 
(Utah 1983). 
Presumably, Defendant will argue that the facial 
jurisdictional defect is cured by the Lower Court's grant of its 
March 23, 1988 Motion for Relief from Judgment; in granting the 
60(b) Motion, the Lower Court declared the effective date of Entry 
of Judgment to be March 23, 1988 rather than February 1, 1988, 
thereby extending the time for a Notice of Appeal or post-trial 
Motion. Therefore it is necessary to examine the validity of the 
Lower Court's actions and the rationales upon which it relied. 
B. THE LOWER COURT CANNOT EXTEND THE TIME FOR APPEAL 
BY GRANTING RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AFTER THE TIME FOR 
APPEAL HAS EXPIRED. 
The sole and exclusive means by which the time for filing an 
appeal can be extended after the thirty (30) day period has expired 
is pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and 
its counterpart in the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. In 
1955, the Utah Supreme Court observed that "[Rule 73(a) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure] prescribes the only circumstance under 
which the court may extend the time for filing notice of appeal."3 
Anderson v. Anderson, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (Utah 1955). The Anderson 
court indicated further that a trial court cannot extend the time 
for filing a Notice of Appeal by granting relief from Judgment 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when a Notice 
of Appeal has not been filed in time. Id. 
In Utah, relief from a Judgment may be obtained from the trial 
court or the appellate court by utilizing separate and distinct 
procedures. The trial court may grant certain forms of relief 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b) or 59(e) if relief is requested 
within ten (10) days of the Entry of Judgment. The interplay 
between these rules and separate relief requested from the 
appellate court can be compared to the function of the esophagus 
and trachea. If the movant has timely pursued relief from the 
trial court he is not required to pursue an appeal at the same 
time. The treatment of a Rule 60(b) motion is, however, quite 
different. 
A 60(b) motion by its own terms "does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation." Therefore, the movant 
must pursue the 60(b) Motion and appellate relief simultaneously, 
including filing a Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the 
3In 1985 when the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the provisions for extending the time of 
appeal found in Rule 73a were incorporated into Rule 4(e) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, with certain substantive changes 
which are discussed in Section C below. 
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Entry of Judgment. In the present case, Defendant erroneously 
relies on its 60(b) motion filed fifty (50) days after the Entry 
of Judgment to cure the jurisdictional defect of failing to file 
a timely Notice of Appeal. If this were possible, a trial court 
could extend the time for appeal by several months, or even years, 
by granting a 60(b) motion at some distant point. The effect would 
be to obliterate the 30 day time limit for appeals and the limited 
provisions for extending the time for appeal under Rule 4(e) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Holbrook v. Hodson, 466 P.2d 843 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the same type of "end run" 
around the appellate rules which Defendant now attempts. In that 
case, Judgment was entered for plaintiff. Defendant thereafter 
filed an untimely motion for new trial. After the time for filing 
an appeal had passed, defendant realized his motion for new trial 
was untimely and moved pursuant to Rule 60(b) for relief from the 
late filing. The trial court subsequently granted the motion for 
relief from the late filing but denied the motion for new trial. 
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal within thirty days of the 
denial of new trial. The Utah Supreme Court denied the appeal, 
reasoning that the trial court's grant of a 60(b) motion, after the 
time for appeal has expired, cannot reinstate the appeal. "There 
is no manner by which the district court can then subsequently 
confer jurisdiction upon this court." Id. at 845. 
The Holbrook decision is dispositive of the present case. 
Defendant, like the defendant in Holbrook, filed a 60(b) motion 
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after the time for appeal had expired. In Holbrook, the defendant 
sought relief from an untimely filing. In the present case the 
Defendant seeks relief for a complete failure to file within the 
time prescribed by law. Both trial courts attempted, by granting 
60(b) relief, to retroactively reinstate the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court. The present case, therefore, must suffer the same 
fate as Holbrook. 
C. THE GROUNDS FOR GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 60(b) MOTION 
DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXTENSION UNDER 
RULE 4(e), RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Defendant's 60(b) motion in reality was not for relief from 
the Judgment. Nor did the Lower Court grant relief from Judgment. 
Rather, Defendant's 60(b) motion was for relief from the 
jurisdictional defect of failing to file a timely Notice of Appeal. 
Ultimately, the Lower Court purportedly granted relief from the 
failure to file a timely appeal, not from the Judgment itself. 
However, Defendant's error was not simply in mislabelling the 
requested relief. The grounds advanced by Defendant simply did not 
justify an extension of time to appeal. The grounds submitted by 
Defendant in support of requested Rule 60 relief was that 
Plaintiff's counsel failed to give Defendant notice of Entry of 
Judgment until the time for appeal had expired and thereby 
prevented the defendant from moving for a new trial under Rule 59 
or filing a notice of appeal. Based on that sole rationale, Judge 
Wahlquist granted the 60(b) motion, purportedly relieving Defendant 
from its failure to file a timely appeal. In a letter written on 
the same day that Judge Wahlquist granted the 60(b) motion, 
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Defendant's counsel describes Judge Wahlquist's reasoning in 
granting the motion. 
Judge Wahlquist said that it was apparent to him that 
whoever lost at trial would want to appeal, and so there 
was a real prejudice in the plaintiff not notifying us 
of the entry of judgment, and so judgment would be 
reentered as of today so that we could file a motion for 
new trial and/or appeal. (Addendum 11) 
The basis on which Defendant's Motion for Relief was submitted 
and admittedly decided does not satisfy the requirements necessary 
for an extension of time to appeal under Rule 4(e). Rule 4(e) of 
the Rules of Utah Supreme Court provides, in part: 
The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect 
or good cause may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than thirty days after 
the expiration of the time prescribed by subparagraph (a) 
of this rule. . . . 
By reading Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in 
conjunction with Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
it is obvious that the Plaintiff's failure to give notice of Entry 
of Judgment cannot constitute excusable neglect or good cause. 
Rule 58A(d) provides: 
The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing of entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this 
provision. 
Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
demonstrates that the failure to give Notice of Entry of Judgment, 
as a matter of law, does not constitute excusable neglect nor good 
cause for extending the time within which to file a notice of 
appeal pursuant to Rule 4(e). 
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The clear intent of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Appellate Rules is illustrated by reviewing specific changes made 
to the rules and the development of the current rules. Prior to 
January 1, 1985, Rule 73(a) provided: 
(a) When and how taken. When an appeal is permitted 
from a District court to the Supreme Court, the time 
within which an appeal may be taken shall be one month 
from the entry of the judgment or order appealed from 
unless a shorter time is provided by law, except that 
upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure 
of a party to learn of the entry of judgment, the 
district court in any action may extend the time for 
appeal not exceeding one month from the expiration of the 
original time herein prescribed. (emphasis added) 
With the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1985, 
the failure of a party to receive notice of entry of judgment, 
which had been hailed by Utah Courts as the only circumstance under 
which the trial courts might extend the time for filing a notice 
of appeal, (Anderson v. Anderson, supra. Holbrook v. Hodson, 
supra), was deleted from the rule. Almost concurrently, Rule 
58A(d) was amended in 1986 to add the final sentence, "However, the 
time for filing a Notice of Appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirement of this provision," 
The changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate 
Rules evidence a clear intent to eliminate failure to give or 
receive notice of entry of judgment as a basis for extending the 
time of appeal. Under the present rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
"excusable neglect" is governed by a strict standard. Prowswood. 
Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). The 
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Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court explains: 
Excusable neglect and good cause under this paragraph 
refer generally to an extraordinary circumstance that 
prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of 
appeal and not to inadvertence or oversight on the part 
of counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize 
an appeal. 
Under the facts of the present case, Plaintiff's failure to 
provide Notice of Entry of Judgment does not constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance that prevented the Defendant from filing 
a timely notice of appeal. As discussed above, two separate sets 
of Findings and Conclusions were submitted to Defendant's counsel, 
a lengthy hearing was held on Defendant's objections to the 
proposed Findings and Conclusions, the Lower Court announced its 
Findings and Conclusions in open court and Defendant's counsel knew 
or had reason to know of the imminence of Entry of Judgment. Under 
those circumstances, Defendant's failure to file a timely Notice 
of Appeal was, most likely, a result of inadvertence, oversight or 
a lack of vigilance on the part of counsel. At a minimum, 
Defendant's counsel apparently did not inquire nor attempt to 
ascertain whether Judgment had been entered for more than five 
weeks following his receipt of the Findings, Conclusion and 
Judgment which were ultimately signed and entered by the Lower 
Court. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM PURSUING THIS APPEAL BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS OF 
JUDGMENT. 
On April 25, 1989, Judge Wahlquist denied Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial, holding that Defendant's payment of the full 
Judgment amount constituted a complete end to the matter and 
estopped Defendant from seeking a limited new trial. (Addendum 5) 
Judge Wahlquist's ruling is not only dispositive of Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial but is also dispositive of this appeal. 
Utah courts have consistently held since the case of Sierra Nevada 
Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., 156 P. 946 (Utah 1916) that when a 
Judgment is voluntarily paid, the amount accepted, and the Judgment 
satisfied, "the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal 
is waived." Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973). 
Under the facts of the present case and applicable law, no basis 
exists for disturbing this matter, which came to final rest on 
April 14, 1988. A brief review of only a few facts is necessary 
to verify Judge Wahlquist's conclusion. The facts set forth below 
are also included in the multi-colored time line at Addendum 1. 
1. On March 2, 1988, Plaintiff began executing on 
its Judgment by serving a Writ of Garnishment 
on Defendant's bank. 
2. On March 8 in a telephone conversation, Defendant's 
counsel agreed to immediately deliver a check in the 
amount of $19,634.71 and the remainder of the 
Judgment balance within 30 days if Plaintiff would 
suspend its execution attempts. Plaintiff agreed 
and received the partial payment that same day. 
3. On April 4, 1988, Defendant hand-delivered a check 
for the remaining Judgment balance and a 
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Satisfaction of Judgment to counsel for Plaintiff. 
4. On April 6, 1988, Defendant's counsel mailed 
Plaintiff a Satisfaction of Judgment which had been 
revised at the request of Plaintiff's counsel. 
5. On April 14, 1988, Plaintiff's counsel executed the 
Satisfaction of Judgment and filed it with the Lower 
Court. 
In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as a general rule that one who accepts a benefit under 
a Judgment is estopped from later attacking the Judgment on appeal, 
and one who acquiesces in a Judgment cannot later attack it. 
Hence, in the present case, Defendant may not appeal having 
acquiesced by payment of the Judgment; Plaintiff may not appeal 
having accepted the benefit of payment. Utah courts have also 
recognized that a party paying a Judgment may accept benefits of 
the Judgment and thereby be precluded from appeal. Trees at 613. 
By paying the Judgment, Defendant obtained the benefit of avoiding 
execution and additional costs and interest. Defendant benefited 
by avoiding Plaintiff's appeal of the Judgment, which was 
significantly smaller than prayed for in the Complaint. 
Defendant now claims that the only portion of the case at rest 
is plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant alleges, however, that its 
Counterclaim for approximately $150,000.00 remains vital even 
though the Satisfaction of Judgment drafted by Defendant's counsel 
fails to reference any intention to preserve the right of appeal 
upon any portion of the case. In Hollinasworth v. Farmers 
Insurance Co. . 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to sanction such tactics. There, a Judgment creditor 
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drafted a general Satisfaction of Judgment with no reference to an 
intent to appeal any portion of the case. Thereafter, the Judgment 
creditor attempted to appeal a portion of the Judgment. The Utah 
Supreme Court refused to allow the appeal, ruling that absent some 
contrary expression in the Satisfaction of Judgment, the matter was 
completely at rest and the right to appeal foreclosed. 
One of the basic policies of the doctrines of "acceptance of 
benefits" and acquiescence is to avoid the "surprise attack" 
tactics which Defendant now seeks to employ. 
The rule embodies a valid protection of the successful 
party in the trial court. An appellant who accepts the 
benefits of a judgment from which he is appealing 
accomplishes a significant shift in the burden of risks; 
he exposes the respondent to the possibility not only to 
a possible loss on appeal, but also the potential loss 
of the benefit he has provided to the appellant, 
(emphasis added) 
Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d at 613. Defendant should not be allowed 
to lull Plaintiff into foregoing any appeal of the matter while 
secretly harboring the intent to subsequently appeal a portion of 
the Judgment from which only it may benefit. 
Defendant relies on the fact that counsel for Plaintiff struck 
out general release language in the April 4, 1988 Satisfaction of 
Judgment. (Brief of Defendant, page 4.) In reality, the language 
stricken out was a unilateral release of the Defendant from any 
further liability. In light of the fact that the satisfaction 
itself is a general release of both parties the deleted language 
was superfluous. Under the Hollinasworth case, the inclusion or 
exclusion of the stricken language would not justify the 
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Defendant's subsequent appeal. In Judge Wahlquist's April 25 
ruling, he also rejected this argument, stating: 
The release in question was executed by plaintiff's 
attorneys at the invitations of defense counsel. It is, 
in its general terms, a complete release. Neither side 
should be permitted to set aside this release. The 
defendant should be estopped to ask for a limited trial. 
(Addendum 4) 
The requested appeal of Defendant's counterclaims doesn't fall 
within an exception to the general rule which precludes a post-
Satisfaction appeal. Defendant alleges that the doctrines of 
Acquiescence and Acceptance of Benefit do not preclude an appeal 
of its counterclaim alone because it is a separate and distinct 
claim. The Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Eddy, supra, recognized 
an exception to the general rule under the following circumstances: 
If a judgment is entered as to one part of a controversy, 
which is separate and distinct from another part, and 
disposition of the latter cannot affect the disposition 
of the former, a party may accept the money or property 
to which he is entitled and not be deemed to waive his 
right to appeal as to other independent claims which the 
court refused to grant. Id. 
Unfortunately, Defendant's Counterclaim is not a separate, 
distinct, independent claim. The Lower Court so ruled in his April 
25 ruling on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial: 
The issues are so interwoven that it would be illogical 
to permit the defendant to pick and choose from the 
accounting, etc., and the delay in construction events, 
issues only that he wishes to be granted a new trial on. 
These issues that he chooses to present at a new trial 
are interwoven with the other issues and cannot in an 
intelligent manner be separated. (Addendum 5) 
The issues of construction costs, delays, and overruns are 
inextricably interwoven in the threads of both the counterclaim and 
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complaint. The jury's award to Plaintiff was premised, in part, 
on the finding that Plaintiff was not responsible for delays and 
overruns. Therefore, an appeal of Defendant's Counterclaims 
unavoidably effects the other part of the judgment and is barred. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IS NOT GROUNDS FOR UPSETTING THE JURY 
VERDICT. 
Defendant complains that the Lower Court improperly failed to 
give its requested Jury Instructions 1, 2 (Counterclaim for 
gymnasium cost overruns) 3, and 4 (Counterclaim for delay damages) . 
Defendant's requested jury instructions 1 through 4 are, in fact, 
stock jury instructions unrelated to its Counterclaims. For the 
purpose of responding to Defendant's Brief, Plaintiff has assumed 
that Defendant intended to address the Lower Court's failure to 
give Defendant's requested jury instructions 9, 10 (Counterclaim 
for gymnasium cost overman) 11, and 12 (Counterclaim delay 
damages). 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE LOWER COURT'S 
FAILURE TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 11 AND 12 
AND, THEREFORE, MAY NOT RAISE IT ON APPEAL. 
Prior to instructing the jury and closing argument, the Lower 
Court distributed jury instructions it intended to give, and gave 
counsel the opportunity to review them and place objections, if 
any, on the record. (Transcript at page 602.) Defendant's counsel 
placed several objections on the record but failed to object to the 
Court's refusal to give instructions 11 and 12. (Transcript 606 
through 608.) Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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provides, in pertinent part, "no party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto." Therefore, Defendant may not now for the first time on 
appeal raise that issue. 
Rule 51 goes on to state, "Notwithstanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice may review the giving or failure to give an 
instruction." While the appellate court may, if it chooses, depart 
from the general rule and review the failure to give an instruction 
for which no objection was raised at the trial court, such 
departures are only made "under unusual circumstances where the 
interests of justice urgently so demand" (citations omitted), 
Williams v. Lloyd, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (Utah 1965). Furthermore, the 
party pursuing the appeal has the burden to present persuasive 
reasons why the appellate court should invoke such discretion. E. 
A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy and Sons, 665 P.2d 
132 0 (Utah 1983). In the instant case, Defendant has advanced no 
reason whatsoever why this Court should invoke its discretion and 
depart from the general rule. Under the circumstances, Defendant's 
appeal of the Lower Court's failure to give requested instructions 
11 and 12 must be rejected. 
Even ignoring Defendant's failure to preserve its objection 
at trial, independent grounds exist for rejecting the appeal. 
Instructions 11 and 12 relate to Defendant's counterclaim allegedly 
caused by Plaintiff's construction delays. Defendant's theory of 
delay damages was adequately presented to the jury in special 
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interrogatories 5A and 5B with their accompanying explanation. 
(Record at pages 632, 633.) In 1987 this Court rejected an 
appellant's claim that the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
on his theory of the claim by failing to give a specific 
instruction. Joraensen v. ISSA, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987). In 
denying the appeal, the Court stated, "It is not prejudicial error 
to fail to use specific instructions if the substance of the 
requested instruction is covered in the instructions given." 
Stratton v. Nielsen, 477 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1970). The court 
explained, "The exact language need not be given but the basic 
theory espoused must be explained to the jury in ordinary, concise 
and understandable language." Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878, 
880 (Utah 1974). 
The evidence adduced at trial proved conclusively that the 
completion dates included in the contract were target dates only. 
Alan Lipman, Defendant's president, was asked if the completion 
dates were estimates. He responded, "I guess they were target 
dates. Estimates to me is a broad based guess. Sure, they weren't 
hard, there was no guarantee in that contract that if they didn't 
finish it on such and such a date that there was a penalty." 
(Transcript page 307.) In the absence of a contractual duty to 
complete construction on a specific date, Interrogatory No. 5A and 
its accompanying explanation accurately charge the jury with 
determining if the Plaintiff had unreasonably delayed completion. 
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B. THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS 9 
AND 10 WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
[The failure to give a requested instruction] is not 
reversible if it is not material; or it did not seriously 
affect or alter the result; or cause no substantial 
injury to the complaining party; or if the introduction 
could not in any event have benefited the party 
requesting it. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added) 
75 Am. Jur.2d Trial Section 589 (1962). In refusing to give 
instructions 9 and 10, Judge Wahlquist stated that an award under 
the counterclaim theory would necessarily be offset by the value 
of the benefit conferred on Defendant. Therefore, Defendant could 
not have benefited from the instructions had they been given. 
(Transcript page 606.) 
A brief review of undisputed facts condensed from Defendant's 
witnesses in the trial transcript verifies the correctness of Judge 
Wahlquistfs ruling: 
1. The agreement entered into between Plaintiff 
and Defendant was a cost plus contract (testimony of 
architect Mike Sanders, Transcript page 36; testimony of 
Alan Lipman, Transcript page 3 01). Plaintiff was to be 
paid the cost of construction plus a mark-up or 
percentage of 5 percent for profit and overhead 
(Transcript page 19). 
2. The contract was performed under a "fast track" 
construction mode. (Testimony of Mike Sanders, 
Transcript page 36; testimony of Alan Lipman, Transcript 
page 303). In fast track construction a contractor is 
selected and begins work prior to the completion of plans 
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and specifications. Final construction documents are 
completed during the course of construction (Transcript 
page 17). 
3. The architect, prior to completing construction 
plans or specifications, estimated the cost of the 
gymnasium remodeling to be $48,239, That amount was 
included in the contract as a "budgetary target price" 
(Transcript page 42) . The budgetary target did not 
constitute a hard dollar figure or firm bid for 
completing construction (Transcript pages 325, 531). 
4. Plaintiff remodeled or renovated the gymnasium 
according to plan in a good workmanlike manner. 
(Transcript page 80) . The work was completed in 
accordance with the architect's plans and specifications 
despite Plaintiff's request to make modifications in 
order to reduce costs (Transcript pages 127 through 141) . 
The architect admitted that construction could not have 
been completed, according to his plans for the amounts 
he estimated (Transcript page 77). 
5. All witnesses testified that the $137,000 
charged by Plaintiff actually represented the value of 
the gymnasium improvements. None of the costs submitted 
were erroneous, trumped-up or falsified (Transcript pages 
88, 314-316). 
When Alan Lipman was asked if the $137,000 accurately 
represented the value of improvements to the gymnasium he responded 
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"basically the overall value I guess is there. It's value that we 
couldn't afford. It's value that we didn't want to spend" 
(Transcript page 314). Mr. Lipman's testimony accurately depicts 
the basis of Defendant's Counterclaim for the return of the 
difference between what Defendant hoped the cost would be and what 
the cost actually was. Defendant does not claim that it did not 
ask for the improvements performed by Plaintiff. Defendant does 
not claim that it got more or less than what it asked for. 
Defendant does not claim that Plaintiff promised to perform the 
work for a fixed price. Nor does Defendant claim that Plaintiff's 
bill misrepresents the actual value of the work performed. What 
Defendant does claim is that it cost more than what it had 
anticipated or wanted to pay. No such cause of action exists in 
American jurisprudence. 
The record is devoid of any allegation that Plaintiff acted 
as an intermeddler, volunteer or otherwise forced an unwanted 
benefit on Defendant. Defendant requested that the work be 
performed, Plaintiff performed the work in accordance with the 
plans and specifications provided. The work was performed by the 
Plaintiff with the reasonable expectation that it would be paid for 
the value of its services under a cost plus contract. And, 
Plaintiff's bill was equal to the value of the services rendered. 
Under these circumstances, even if Defendant had a valid cause of 
action, quantum meruit would offset anything awarded to Defendant. 
Therefore, under the facts of the case and pertinent law Judge 
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Wahlquis^s refusal to give requested jury instructions 9 and 10 
was correct. 
POINT IV 
REFERENCES TO THE ARCHITECT AS AGENT OF THE DEFENDANT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Based on the facts of the case, the architect probably was the 
agent of the Defendant. However, even if no agency existed, the 
instructions given are not clearly erroneous. At page 13 of 
Defendant's Brief Defendant cites 5 Am. Jur.2d Architects Section 
6 (1962) for the general proposition that "An architect, as far as 
preparation of plans is concerned, acts as an independent 
contractor . . . " The language in the ellipsis which Defendant 
chose to omit is "but so far as regards the performance of his 
supervisory functions with respect to a building under construction 
he ordinarily acts as the agent and representative of the person 
for whom the work is being done." Id. at page 668. 
In the present case the architect (1) designed and prepared 
plans (Transcript page 13); (2) solicited proposals from 
contractors (Transcript page 15); (3) interviewed the contractors 
(Transcript page 17); (4) drafted Defendant's contract with 
Plaintiff (Transcript page 3 6) ; (5) reviewed all payment 
applications for Defendant (Transcript page 54) ; (6) supervised 
construction and attended weekly construction meetings (Transcript 
page 424) ; and (7) performed final inspections and certified 
completion of the construction (Transcript page 80). 
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Under the facts of the case Judge Wahlquist's characterization 
of the architect as the Defendant's agent was most likely correct. 
However, even if the architect was, in fact, not the agent of the 
Defendant, no prejudicial error occurred. The scope of Defendant's 
appeal is limited, by its own terms, to the counterclaim. Special 
Interrogatory No. 5A, consistent with Defendant's counterclaim, 
requested the jury to determine if Plaintiff was responsible for 
the construction delays (Transcript page 632) . If, as the jury 
determined, the Plaintiff was not responsible for the delay, 
Defendant has failed to prove an essential element of its 
counterclaim, causation. See Highland Construction Co. v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Utah 1984). 
If Plaintiff did not cause Defendant's damages it makes no 
difference who did, unless Plaintiff can be held responsible for 
the actions of that party. Clearly, Plaintiff was not responsible 
for the architect's acts. The architect, under its contract, may 
or may not have been an agent of the Defendant; however, the 
architect certainly was not an agent of Plaintiff or otherwise in 
privity of contract. Therefore, as it relates to Defendant's 
counterclaim against Plaintiff, the Lower Court's characterization 
of the architect as the Defendant's agent is not clearly erroneous. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT'S BURDEN OF PROOF INSTRUCTION 
ACCOMPANYING SPECIAL INTERROGATORY 5B IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
APPEAL NOR IS IT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The burden of proof issue raised by Defendant at page 14 of 
Defendant's brief is, again, raised for the first time on appeal. 
30 
Defendant failed to object to the burden of proof aspect of 
Interrogatory 5B and its accompanying explanation (Transcript pages 
606 through 608). As stated above in Point III(A), a party may not 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects at the trial level. Rule 51 specifically 
provides, "In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
grounds for his objection." The objection must be sufficiently 
specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47 
(Utah 1974) ; E. A. Strout Western Realty v. W. C. Foy and Sons, 665 
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). 
The trial record is totally devoid of any reference to the 
burden of proof issue or the grounds for an objection thereto. 
Likewise, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any extraordinary or 
special circumstance which would necessitate an invocation of this 
Court's discretion to consider the matter. Therefore, the issue 
is not properly presented on appeal. 
Even if Defendant's failure to object at the trial level is 
disregarded, Defendant's appeal fails on its facts. Defendant's 
brief asserts that Plaintiff's argument, that the Defendant or 
architect actually caused the delay, is an affirmative defense for 
which Plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Defendant misconstrues 
the burdens of the respective parties. As Counterclaimant, 
Defendant bears the burden of proving the elements of its 
counterclaim. Lima School District No. 12 v. Simonson. 683 P.2d 
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471, 477 (Montana 1984) . One of the essential elements of 
Defendant's counterclaim for delay damages is that Plaintiff's acts 
legally caused its damage, or causation. See Highland Construction 
Co., supra at 1047. The Lower Court's specific instruction that 
"The defendant must bear the burden of proof, and prove that some 
delays were unreasonably caused by the plaintiff . . . " merely 
restates the general rule that a claimant must show that a 
particular defendant caused it damages in order to recover. No 
affirmative defense of any nature relieves Defendant from proving 
the essential elements of its claim. 
POINT VI 
THIS APPEAL IS SO FRIVOLOUS THAT THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD 
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFF. 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides as 
follows: 
If the court shall determine that a motion made or 
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
In O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987), the 
Utah Court of Appeals defined a frivolous appeal as "one having no 
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)." The 
Court of Appeals realized this may create a lesser standard than 
the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-27-56 (1953, as 
amended) , but "since a party has already been to court once and has 
had the benefit of one ruling, the decision to appeal should be 
reached only after careful consideration by the party and counsel." 
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O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 310. See Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1983) (construing the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 
78-27-56 (1953, as amended)). 
In Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 
1988), the court awarded the plaintiff costs and attorney fees, 
finding that the defendant failed to make a timely appeal. Here, 
Defendant seeks to appeal even though it failed to file any post-
trial motion for over 50 days after the Entry of Judgment. 
Additionally, Defendant is appealing a Judgment for which it sought 
and received a Satisfaction of Judgment. Finally, Defendant 
attempts to appeal jury instructions to which it failed to object 
at trial, without presenting any circumstance justifying review. 
This makes the Defendant's position as egregious as that of the 
defendant in Barber. 
The Court of Appeals has also cited with approval Auburn 
Harpswell Association v. Day, 438 A.2d 234 (Me. 1981), which helps 
define when imposition of sanctions is appropriate. Porco v. 
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). The court in Day said 
that sanctions should be applied when "an appeal is obviously 
without any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood 
of prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the 
judgment of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and 
dissipation of time and resources of the Law Court." Day, 438 A.2d 
at 239. Here, for the reasons stated above, Defendant has 
certainly increased the cost of litigation and caused a dissipation 
of the time and resources of this Court. Furthermore, Defendant 
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is appealing a Judgment which is not appealable and has been 
voluntarily satisfied. 
Neither Defendant nor its counsel reached the decision to 
appeal "after careful consideration." O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 310. 
Had they carefully considered the facts and law they would have 
realized that there is no legal or factual basis for this appeal. 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 
1988); Briaham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1988). 
The record in this case leaves no doubt that the appeal is 
frivolous. Therefore, Plaintiff suggests that this is an 
appropriate case in which to award double costs (including 
attorney's fees) and damages, and remand the matter to the Lower 
Court for a determination of attorneys' fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that Defendant's 
appeal be denied, that the matter be set finally to rest and that 
Plaintiff be awarded damages and double costs (including attorneys' 
fees) incurred in defending against the appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£ ^day of October, 1989. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
Michael J. Wilkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 1989, I 
hereby caused four true and correct copies of Respondent's Brief 
to be hand-delivered to the following counsel of record: 
Edward J. McDonough 
50 South Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Michael J. Wilkins, #3470 
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5775 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD ) CIVIL NO. 94630 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ) 
Defendants. ) Judge Wahlquist 
After trial to the Court with an advisory jury, and upon 
receipt by the court of the findings of the jury with respect to 
those matters submitted to it by special interrogatories, the 
Court makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties entered into a written agreement on July 
16, 1984 by which plaintiff agreed to supply construction 
services and materials at the St. Joseph High School in Ogden, 
Utah. 
2. The contract language was drafted by defendant's agent. 
3. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the construction 
costs allowed in the contract plus a 5% supervision fee. 
1 
4. Although the contract between the parties designates 
dates for substantial completion of September 21, 1984 for work 
on the gym and November 30, 1984 for work on the classroom and 
library, these dates were target dates and no specific penalty 
was to be attached to the failure of the plaintiff to meet these 
dates. 
5. Although the contract between the parties designates 
budgetary target prices of $48,239 for the gym work and $299,953 
for the classroom/library work, these amounts were estimates 
only, and were not binding upon plaintiff. 
6. No guaranteed maximum cost was agreed between the 
parties at the time the contract was executed or thereafter. 
7. All of the work expected of plaintiff under the 
contract was completed prior to May 13, 1985. 
8. On May 28, 1985 the work of plaintiff was certified by 
defendant's architect as having fully met the requirements of the 
contract. 
9. The work of plaintiff was accepted by defendant on May 
13, 1985, and occupied and used from that date forward. 
10. The work of plaintiff fully met the requirements of the 
contract, and defendant at no time raised objections to plaintiff 
that the work was deficient in any way. 
11. Plaintiff made demand on May 13, 1985 for final payment 
of amounts owed it under the contract. 
12. On June 12, 1985, plaintiff was provided with lien 
waivers and proof that all indebtedness on the project had been 
2 
paid. 
13. As of June 12, 1985, plaintiff was entitled to be paid 
the remaining unpaid costs it had expended on the project, plus 
5% as its fee. This amount included: 
a. $8,550.70, for the amount withheld from the 
billing submitted by E.M. Whitmeyer dated 13 May, 1985; and 
b. $2,046.30 for payments made by plaintiff for 
building permits on the project which were not included in 
the Whitmeyer billing; and 
c. $3,855.00 for labor overhead paid by plaintiff on 
the project and not included in the Whitmeyer building; and 
d. $5,182.71 for miscellaneous costs paid by 
plaintiff on the project and not included in the Whitmeyer 
building. 
14. The total amount to which plaintiff was entitled as of 
June 12, 1985 was $19,634.71. 
15. Under the terms of the contract between the parties, 
plaintiff is entitled to interest on unpaid funds at the rate of 
1.25% per month. 
16. The interest provided for under the contract from June 
12, 1985 until December 12, 1987 amounts to $8,867.30. 
18. As of December 12, 1987, the total amount of principle 
and interest owed plaintiff under the contract is $28,502.01. 
19. From December 12, 1987 until the date of judgment, 
interest continues to accrue at the rate of 1.25% per month on 
the unpaid total of $28,502.01. 
3 
QM 
20. The plaintiff did not unreasonably delay completion of 
the project. 
21. The defendant was not damaged by any act or failure to 
act required of the plaintiff by the contract. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff committed no material breach of the contract 
between the parties. 
2. Defendant is not entitled to any recovery against 
plaintiff on its Counterclaims. 
3. Defendant breached its obligations under the contract 
by failing to pay to plaintiff the amounts due, when due. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant 
in the amount of $29,544.75 plus interest at 1.25% per month from 
December 13, 1987 until the date of judgment, and thereafter at 
the legal rate of 12% per annum, plus its costs. 
Dated this day of , 198 . 
BY THE COURT: 
John F. Wahlquist 
District Judge 
1490P.33 
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470 
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5775 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 94630 
Judge Wahlquist 
The Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact 
and its Conclusions of Law, hereby grants judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $19,634.01, 
plus interest thereon in the amount of $ to the 
date of judgment, plus costs of $_ 
of $ 
for a total sum 
_, plus interest thereon at the rate of 
% per annum until fully paid. 
DATED this day of 
BY THE COURT: 
, 198 
John F. Wahlquist 
District Judge 
1490P.32 
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470 
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5775 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CIVIL NO. 94630 
Judge Wahlquist 
I here certify I caused a true and accurate copy of the 
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and proposed 
JUDGMENT and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE to be delivered to 
Edward J. McDonough, Esq., Berman & O'Rorke, 50 South Main, 
Suite 1250, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, this /£ ^  day of 
December, 1987. 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
Michael J. Wilkins 
1490P.44 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Edward J. McDonough, 2177 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS ] 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL ) 
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
) PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
• Civil No. 94630 
TO 
Defendant objects to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law submitted by the plaintiff on the grounds 
that they are not accurately based upon the evidence at the 
trial. The defendant requests that the court enter the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the 
defendant and submitted herewith. 
DATED: January / , 1988. 
Edward J. McDonough v 
50 South Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1008N 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
y/7 
On this i day of January, 1988, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following: 
Kendall S. Peterson 
Michael J. Wilkins 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
1008N 
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^ff-uMp £*-*-> 
Edward J. McDonough, 2177 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS \ 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff, | 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL ] 
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ] 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Civil No. 94630 
The jury made the following findings on special 
interrogatories submitted to it: 
1. The request for final payment submitted by the 
plaintiff's agent E.M. Whitmeyer on May 13, 1985, did not 
include an amount of $2,046.30 for payments made by plaintiff 
for building permits on the project; an amount of $3,855 for 
labor overhead paid by the plaintiff on the project; and an 
amount of $5,182.71 for miscellaneous costs paid by the 
plaintiff on the project. 
2. The plaintiff did not unreasonably delay 
completion of the project. 
3. The plaintiff was not entitled to charge for the 
time that E.M. Whitmeyer spent at the job site. 
The Court makes the following additional findings of 
fact: 
4. E.M. Whitmeyer responded to an invitation from 
the architect Michael Sanders to D.J. Company to submit a 
proposal for remodeling and additions to St. Joseph High School. 
5. E.M. Whitmeyer submitted a proposal in the name 
of the plaintiff/ explaining that the plaintiff and D.J. 
Company were involved in a merger. 
6. The plaintiff and the defendant signed a written 
agreement on July 16, 1984 by which plaintiff agreed to supply 
construction services and materials at the St. Joseph High 
School in Ogden, Utah, in connection with a remodeling and 
expansion project that included two phases, the gymnasium phase 
and the classroom phase. E.M. Whitmeyer signed the agreement 
on behalf of the plaintiff. 
7. E.M. Whitmeyer was the only person who 
represented the plaintiff with respect to the agreement and the 
carrying out of its terms. 
8. Under the terms of the written agreement, the 
plaintiff was required to provide the defendant with full and 
detailed accounting records so that costs of the project could 
be monitored by the defendant. The plaintiff, prior to October 
1, 1984, failed to do so. 
-2-
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9. On October 1/ 1984, the defendant was informed 
for the first time that there had been a cost overrun on the 
gymnasium portion of the construction project, and that the 
gymnasium portion of the project cost more than 200% of the 
amount budgeted for the gymnasium. 
10. The defendant had a limited fund for the 
project. Funds diverted to the gymnasium phase were not 
available for the classroom phase. The classroom phase was the 
primary purpose of the fund and was more important to the 
defendant than the gymnasium phase. 
11. E.M. Whitmeyer, for and on behalf of the 
plaintiff, agreed to work closely with the defendant to insure 
that such a cost overrun would not occur on the classroom phase 
of the project. 
12. E.M. Whitmeyer met weekly thereafter with members 
of the defendant for this purpose. 
13. All subsequent requests for payment submitted by 
the plaintiff included specific cost figures which were 
approved by the defendant. 
14. The plaintiff and defendant agreed that no 
expenditures beyond those included in the cost figure attached 
as a second sheet to the periodic requests for payment would be 
made by the plaintiff without prior agreement of the defendant. 
15. On May 13, 1985, E.M. Whitmeyer, for and on 
behalf of the plaintiff, submitted a final request for payment 
-3-
in an amount which coincided with the cost figures agreed upon 
by the plaintiff and the defendant at the weekly meetings and 
in the approval of the cost detail included in prior requests 
for payment. 
16. On May 13, 1985, the plaintiff also submitted an 
additional request for payment, presented by the plaintiff's 
controller Richard Lambert. The request for payment submitted 
by Mr. Lambert exceeded the amount of the billing submitted by 
E.M. Whitmeyer. 
17. The defendant relied upon the statements of Mr. 
Whitmeyer in the weekly meeting and representations of Mr. 
Whitmeyer in the cost detail provided with requests for 
payments prior to the final request. In October 1984, the 
defendant changed its position to its detriment in reliance 
upon the representations of the plaintiff, through Mr. E.M. 
Whitmeyer, by agreeing to go forward with the project and not 
to invoke its remedy of immediately cancelling the contract to 
prevent further cost overrun. 
18. If the plaintiff, through its sole agent for the 
project E.M. Whitmeyer, had not assured the defendant that the 
budget for the classroom phase of the project would be adhered 
to and the budget would not be exceeded without prior 
permission of the defendant, the defendant would not have 
proceeded with the classroom phase of the project. 
19. The written agreement provides that work on the 
-4-
gymnasium would be substantially completed by September 21, 
1984/ and that work on the classroom and library phase would be 
completed by November 30/ 1984. The written contract language 
was absolute and unmodified in any way. While no specific 
liquidated damages were included for failure of the plaintiff 
to meet the completion deadline set forth in the written 
contract/ the defendant is entitled/ under the language of the 
contract/ to all actual damages attributable to any delay in 
completion of the work which was not approved by the architect 
pursuant to an extension of time granted by a change order to 
the contract/ in accordance with the conditions of the contract. 
20. Work on the project was not completed by the 
plaintiff until May 13/ 1985. 
21. The defendant suffered direct damages in loss of 
revenues and in extra utility costs of $19/012.00 as a result 
of the failure of the plaintiff to complete the project on time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The plaintiff is estopped from claiming any sum 
greater than the amount of the Whitmeyer final request for 
payment. The plaintiff is estopped by the defendant's 
justifiable reliance upon the plaintiff's representations that 
the price of the total project would not exceed the amount 
agreed to by the plaintiff and the defendant as specified on 
the continuation sheets of the requests for payment submitted 
by the plaintiff prior to the final request for payment. 
-5-
B. The plaintiff is entitled to $8,550.70 from the 
defendant owing on the Whitmeyer final request for payment. 
Because this amount was tendered by the defendant to the 
plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action, and refused 
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to no interest. 
C. The defendant is entitled to the sum of 
$19,012.00 against the plaintiff on the defendant's 
counterclaim for failure to complete the construction project 
on time. 
D. The defendant is entitled to the sum of 
$83,970.30 from the plaintiff on the defendant's counterclaim 
for failure of the plaintiff to provide accounting information 
prior to October 1, 1984 sufficient to avoid the cost overrun 
on the gymnasium. 
E. The defendant is entitled to judgment against the 
plaintiff in the amount of $94,431.60, plus interest and costs. 
DATED: January , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. John F. Wahlquist 
1009N 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 7 day of January, 1988, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
to the following: 
Kendall S. Peterson 
Michael J. Wilkins 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
.bLj/kb»/v 
1009N 
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ADDENDUM 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendant. 
I regret that I misplaced Volume 4 of the record. I am 
painfully aware that this negligent act of mine further delayed 
the proceedings. I also recognize that it has put counsel to 
inconvenience. It has now been carefully read, including the 
briefs and motions. 
HISTORY OF THE MATTER 
The defendant desired to update and add to its high 
school. It was desirable that the construction be completed as 
quickly as possible. The defendant employed an architect. The 
architect did some preliminary sketches and estimates. He hoped 
to complete details, etc., at a later date. The architect 
anticipated that he would complete this work during the early 
construction. The plaintiff and defendant signed a contract that 
is in evidence. It was a "cost plus" contract, and could be more 
accurately described as providing for a five percent management 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 860994630 
Page 2 
Ruling on Motion for 
New Trial 
Case No. 860994630 
supervision fee. It did contain "target budget figures". The 
contract provided that these were goals and not hard "cost 
quotes". The contract set out completion dates, but without 
penalties/ etc. Without the completed plans and specificationsf 
the target dates can be accepted only as goals. The undisputed 
working arrangements can be accurately described in local 
construction terms as a "fast track construction contract": that 
is, one that starts immediately and proceeds while the plans and 
specifications are being prepared. The "fast track contracts" 
are not uncommon in this area, and on occasion, have the effect 
of bringing on an early completion date. They also frequently 
have a desirable effect of permitting growth in design or changes 
in the construction project. When the dispute ends, long after 
the dated goal and far beyond the targeted budget, disagreements 
were broad. There were many sets of used or disgarded drawings. 
Thousands of cost records exist. The parties literally wanted 
the jury to perform a complete audit and evaluation of the wisdom 
of each expenditure. The endeavor they asked the jury to perform 
would have taken trained accountants and construction experts 
months. After the evidence was completed/ the judge searched for 
a method of simplifying the issues for the jury. 
It worked out that the parties1 evidence does not 
dispute more than a few items of sufficient magnitude to justify 
discussing them, plusf of course, the parties1 general dispute 
Page 3 
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New Trial 
Case No. 860994630 
and the blaming of one another for the delays. These issues were 
presented to the jury in a special verdict form. 
The most serious question wasf "Who is to blame for the 
delays?" There was no conflicting evidence as to whether any 
monies claimed spent were in fact spent/ except as presented in 
the interrogatory forms. There is no issue that the actual 
construction work done was performed in accordance with 
reasonable standards. The delay issue was complex. Safety 
inspectors insisted on many changes. The library eventually lost 
a complete glass wall/ etc. A committee was formed that met 
periodically to review "costsf etc." and re-design the 
construction. The jury placed the blame for the delays on the 
high school and the architect/ not on the construction 
superintendent. At least they did not find defendant had carried 
his burden of proof on this issue. After verdict/ the lawyers 
disputed over what the court's findings of fact/ etc./ should 
be. A lengthy hearing was held. All rulings were made in open 
court in the presence of counsel. Everyone knew what the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were to say before they 
were finally drafted. Plaintiff's counsel prepared and 
circulated them/ but apparently failed to re-circulate them after 
they were in fact signed. 
944 
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Case No. 860994630 
Plaintiff began maneuvers that were intended to force 
payment of the judgment. Defense counsel eventually sent a check 
for the amount of the judgment to the plaintiff's counsel. This 
was done in a way to invite the exercise of a complete release. 
The defense counsel now wishes to be granted a new trial only on 
the issues concerning his counterclaim. Plaintiff objects on the 
grounds that the judgment which was granted in the plaintiffs 
favor is actually less than plaintiffs had hoped for. Plaintiffs 
contend that the release executed by plaintiff's counsel was done 
so at the invitation of defense counsel and actually should be 
viewed as a complete end to the matter. The court agrees. The 
issues are so interwoven that it would be illogical to permit the 
defendant to pick and choose from the accounting, etc.
 f and the 
delay in construction events, issues only that he wishes to be 
granted a new trial on. These issues that he chooses to present 
at a new trial are interwoven with the other issues, and cannot, 
in an intelligent manner, be separated. 
RULING 
The motion for a partial new trial is denied for the 
following reasons: 
1. There was no material error in the trial. The 
verdict rendered by the jury is a plausible interpretation of the 
evidence received. 
945 
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Case No. 860994630 
2. The defendant's counterclaim cannot, in an evidence 
sense, be separated from defendant's contentions; therefore, a 
limited new trial cannot take place. 
3. The release in question was executed by plaintiff's 
attorneys at the invitations of defense counsel. It is, in its 
general terms, a complete release. Neither side should be 
permitted to set aside this release. The defendant should be 
estopped to ask for a limited trial. 
DATED this V*Jr) day of April, 1989. 
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CERTIFTCATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^ S day of April, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motion for New 
Trial was mailed to the following: 
Michael J. Wilkins 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward J. McDonough 
Attorney for Defendant 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
A CARR, Secretary 
ADDENDUM 6 
Edward J. McDonough, 2177 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS j 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL ) 
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ] 
Defendant. J 
1 DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS 
> TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i (Oral Argument Not 
i Requested) 
i Civil No. 94630 
Defendant objects to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law served by the plaintiff on January 21, 1988, 
on the grounds that the proposed findings are not accurately 
based upon the evidence at the trial. The defendant objects to 
specific proposed findings of fact as follows: 
Finding No. 2, because the evidence presented at 
trial, and particularly the contract between the architect and 
the owner, establish that the architect was not -defendant's 
agent.M 
Finding No. 4, because the evidence presented at 
trial, and most specifically the written "Standard Form of 
Agreement Between Owner And Contractor" did not refer to the 
contract completion dates as mere "target dates" but rather, to 
the contrary, set fixed dates for completion which became a 
contractual obligation of the plaintiff; and because Finding 
No. 4 misstates the language of the agreement with regard to 
its liquidated damages provision. 
Finding No. 5, because it is unsupported by the 
evidence. 
Finding No. 7, because there was no evidence presented 
at trial which indicated that the defendant "consented to the 
extension of performance time." 
Finding No. 10, because it misstates the evidence with 
regard to the contracts being unchanged and interrupted. In 
this regard, Finding No. 10 is contradictory of Finding No. 6. 
Finding No. 11, because the evidence showed that a 
guaranteed maximum cost was agreed to between the parties as a 
result of the weekly meeting with commenced on October 1, 1984, 
and which new guaranteed maximum cost was fixed at least by the 
time of the February interim request for payment. 
Finding No. 16, because the jury did not find that the 
plaintiff was entitled to be paid the amounts listed in Finding 
No. 16, only that those amounts had, heretofore, not been paid. 
Finding No. 17, as contrary to the evidence. 
-2- 834 
Finding No. 18, because it is not a finding of fact, 
but rather is a misplaced conclusion of law, and is erroneous 
as a conclusion of law because it misstates the nature and 
effect of the jury interrogatories. 
Finding No. 19, because the evidence showed that the 
"Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner And Contractor" did 
not provide for interest on "any unpaid amounts" but rather on 
amounts to become due and owing under that document, and 
because the contract provided that no amounts became due and 
owing under the contract from the owner until a request for 
payment of the amount from the contractor was certified by the 
architect. 
Finding No. 20, because, while it correctly states the 
Court's finding that interest would run at their legal rates 
for judgment, it misstates the amount due. 
Finding No. 21, as contrary to the evidence. 
Finding No. 22, because it misstates the daily amount 
of interest. 
Finding No. 24, because it is contrary to the evidence. 
The defendant objects to Conclusions of Law Nos. 1, 2, 
3 and 4, as not being based upon proper findings of fact which 
were based upon the evidence at the trial. 
The defendant submits its objections on the argument 
presented with regard to defendant's objections to the original 
-3- 835 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by 
the plaintiff, and the defendant does not request oral argument 
on these objections. 
DATED: January M> , 1988. 
Edward J. McDonough l 
50 South Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Defendant 
1069N 
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, , ^ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this th day of January, 1988, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Oral Argument Not 
Requested) to the following: 
Kendall S. Peterson 
Michael J. Wilkins 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
1069N 
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470 
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5775 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
ST, JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD ) CIVIL NO. 94630 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ) 
Defendants. ) Judge Wahlguist 
After trial to the Court with an advisory jury, and upon 
receipt by the court of the findings of the jury with respect to 
those matters submitted to it by special interrogatories, the 
Court makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties entered into a written agreement on July 
16, 1984 by which plaintiff agreed to supply construction 
services and materials at the St. Joseph High School in Ogden, 
Utah. 
2. The contract language was drafted by defendant's agent. 
3. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the construction 
costs allowed in the contract plus a 5% supervision fee. 
1 
4. Although the contract between the parties designates 
dates for substantial completion of September 21, 1984 for work 
on the gym and November 30, 1984 for work on the classroom and 
library, these dates were target dates and no specific penalty 
was to be attached to the failure of the plaintiff to meet these 
dates. 
5. During the course of performance it became apparent 
that the cost of the building as designed by the architect would 
greatly exceed the amount he had estimated. 
6. In order to reduce costs, the scope of the project, the 
design and the management of costs were modified. The changes 
resulted in redrawing construction documents and weekly 
management meetings to incrementally review costs. 
7. These changes effectively modified the terms of the 
contracted agreement between the parties with respect to time of 
performance. All parties were aware and consented to the 
extension of performance time beyond estimated schedules for 
completion contained in the contract. 
8. The modification of the time terms of the contract did 
not effect the "cost-plus11 nature of the contract. 
9. Although the contract between the parties designates 
budgetary target prices of $48,239 for the gym work and $299,953 
for the classroom/library work, these amounts were estimates 
only, and were not binding upon plaintiff. 
10. The nature of the contract from beginning to end 
remained unchanged and uninterrupted as a "cost-plus" or cost and 
2 
material contract. 
11. No guaranteed maximum cost was agreed between the 
parties at the time the contract was executed or thereafter. 
12. All of the work expected of plaintiff under the 
contract was completed prior to May 13, 1985. 
13. The work of plaintiff was accepted by defendant on May 
13, 1985, and occupied and used from that date forward. 
14. The work of plaintiff fully met the requirements of the 
contract, and defendant at no time raised objections to plaintiff 
that the work was deficient in any way. 
15. Plaintiff made demand on May 13, 1985, for final 
payment of amounts owed it under the contract. 
16. As of May 13, 1985, plaintiff was entitled to be paid 
the remaining unpaid costs it had expended on the project, plus 
5% as its fee. This amount included: 
a. $8,550.70, for the amount withheld from the 
billing submitted by E.M. Whitmeyer dated 13 May, 1985; and 
b. $2,046.30 for payments made by plaintiff for 
building permits on the project which were not included in 
the Whitmeyer billing; and 
c. $3,855.00 for labor overhead paid by plaintiff on 
the project and not included in the Whitmeyer building; and 
d. $5,182.71 for miscellaneous costs paid by 
plaintiff on the project and not included in the Whitmeyer 
building. 
17. The total amount to which plaintiff was entitled as of 
3 
May 13, 1985 was $19,634.71. 
18. As a matter of law, plaintiff is entitled to interest 
on unpaid funds as determined by the special jury verdicts. 
19. The contract between the parties provides for interest 
on any unpaid amounts to accrue at 1.25% per month. 
20. The Court found that interest should accrue on 
$19,634.71 at the legal rate for judgments from May 13, 1985 
until the time judgment is entered. 
21. As of January 21, 1988, the total amount of principle 
and interest owed plaintiff under the contract is $25,984.89. 
22. From January 21, 1988, until the date of judgment, 
interest shall continue to accrue at the rate of 12% per annum 
or $6.46 per day until paid in full. 
23. The plaintiff did not unreasonably delay completion of 
the project. 
24. The defendant was not damaged by any act or failure to 
act required of the plaintiff by the contract. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff committed no material breach of the contract 
between the parties. 
2. Defendant is not entitled to any recovery against 
plaintiff on its Counterclaims. 
3. Defendant breached its obligations under the contract 
by failing to pay to plaintiff the amounts owed, when due. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant 
4 
824 
as of January 21, 1988, in the amount of $25,984.89 plus interest 
at 12% per annum or $6.46 per day until the judgment is paid in 
full. . , / 
Dated this / day of '/Z^S , 19& J . 
V. 
, > BY THE COURT: 
// 'I , 
7 John, F. Wahlquist /, 
/ District Judge ;/ 1490P.33 
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470 
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5775 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 94630 
Judge Wahlquist 
The Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact 
and its Conclusions of Law, hereby grants judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $19,634.71, 
plus interest thereon accruing at the legal rate for judgments of 
12% per annum. From May 13, 1985, until January 21, 1988, 
accrued interest amounted to $6,350.18. Interest shall continue 
to accrue at 12% per annum or $6.46 per day until the judgment is 
fully paid. Further, plaintiff is entitled to an award of its 
820 
Recorded BoolJjJS 
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Indexed 
costs incurred in litigation. The total amount of judgm 
January 13, 1988, is $25,984.89 plus costs o 
DATED this / day of / '/>• ~, 198 
BY Tip: COURT: 
John F. Wahlquist/ 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
1490P.32 
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ADDENDUM 8 
Michael J. Wilkins, #3470 
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5775 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
OF JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 94630 
Plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin and Robbins, by and through 
counsel of record hereby certifies that notice of the signing and 
entry of judgment against St. Joseph's Board of Financial 
Trustees was given on March 7, 1988 by placing a copy of the 
signed judgment in the mail postage prepaid, addressed to Edward 
j. McDonough, Berman & O'Rorke, 50 south Main Street, Suite 1250, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, this *~t>_ day of March, 1987. 
LARSEN & WILKINS 
1490P.62 
1 
ADDENDUM 9 
Edward J. McDonough, 2177 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL ] 
BOARD OB FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ] 
Defendant. 
i RULE 60 MOTION FOR 
> RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 94630 
The defendant moves this Court for its Order setting 
aside the judgment entered on February 1, 1988, on the grounds 
that the judgment was entered by mistake or in error, resulting 
in prejudicial surprise to the defendant, was entered without 
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant as required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the rules of this Court, 
thereby preventing the defendant from moving for a new trial 
under Rule 59, that the failure of the plaintiff to notify the 
defendant of the entry of a judgment in time to move for a new 
trial or appeal constitutes misrepresentation and misconduct on 
the part of counsel for the plaintiff, and was entered in 
violation of Rule 52 and Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Judgment was entered in violation of Rule 52 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it was entered without 
findings of fact and conclusions of law being first made by the 
court. Rule 52(a) requires that: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A . . ." 
The defendant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by the plaintiff, and submitted an 
alternate set of findings and conclusions. This Court has not 
ruled upon the defendant's objections to the plaintiffs 
proposed findings, and no findings have been entered. 
The plaintiff has executed upon the judgment entered 
on February 1, and has garnished the defendant's bank accounts. 
The plaintiff now seeks to add costs to the judgment 
which was entered on February 1 without judgment for costs. 
Instead of reopening the judgment and modifying the judgment to 
add costs for the plaintiff, justice requires in this case that 
the court set aside the judgment entered on February 1 
-2-
889 
entirely, make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, tax the costs 
pursuant to the defendant's motion that costs be taxed, and 
then enter a judgment with notice to the defendant of the entry 
of the judgment so that the defendant can move for a new trial 
or appeal. 
DATED: March >^ , 1988. 
EdWrd J., M&DonougK 
50 South/Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1175N 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this ffl day of March, 1988, I hereby certify that 
I jcoucod fee be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RULE 60 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT to the 
following: 
Kendall S. Peterson 
• MichQei—JT- Wilkins -
LARSEN & WILKINS 
10 East South Temple 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
1175N ' 
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Edward J. McDonough, 2177 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v . i 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL ] 
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, ] 
Defendant. 
i ORDER GRANTING RULE 60 
> RELIEF, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
> RULE 37 MOTION, AND 
l TAXING COSTS. 
I Civil No. 94630 
This matter having come on for hearing on March 23, 
1988# on defendant's Motion To Have Costs Taxed By The Court, 
filed February 12, 1988, the plaintiffs "objection to 
defendant's Motion To Have Costs Taxed By The Court", filed 
March 8, 1988, and the Order obtained by the plaintiff that the 
defendant's president, Allen Lipman, appear in supplemental 
proceedings, and the defendant having made its Motion in open 
Court pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
for relief from the judgment, and the Court having heard 
argument on that Motion as well as on the pending Rule 37 
895 
Motion of the plaintiff and the pending objection by the 
defendant to the plaintiffs second proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and the Court having heard argument of 
counsel, it is hereby, 
ORDERED that the defendants Rule 60 Motion For Relief 
From The Judgment is granted to this extent, that judgment for 
the plaintiff is hereby entered, de novo, as of and under the 
date of March 23, 1988, which date shall be the date of 
judgment for the purposes of all post-trial motions and notice 
of appeal; that the plaintiff is awarded costs in this action 
as set forth in the plaintiff's "Verified Memorandum of Costs" 
dated February 2, 1988, with the exception that the plaintiff 
is not allowed costs for photocopy charges or deposition 
transcripts; that the examination of the defendant's president, 
Allen Lipman, in a supplemental proceeding is continued until 
April 13, 1988 at 9:30 a.m.; that the second set of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared and submitted by the 
plaintiff are adopted by the Court, and that the plaintiffs 
Rule 37 Motion is denied. 
o 
.*£ DATED thisj^^ / day of March, 1988. 
COURT: 
1178N 
. John F. Wafllquist 
District Judge 
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LAW orricea 
BERMAN 5. O'RORKE 
A PKOrCSStOMAl COM^OMATION 
SUITC 1290 COWAftO J . MCOONOUOM 
3 0 SOUTH MAIM ST«CCT « r COUMSCL 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH QAI++ 
TKlSPMOMC ( M O M f C M O 
TTLXCO«*<C* « • « • 131 • • — 
March 23, 1988 
Allen Lipman, President 
Amalgamated Sugar 
P.O. Box 1520 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Re: Jacobsen, Morrin, Robbins v. 
St. Joseph's High School 
Dear Allen: 
I have enclosed with this letter a copy of an Order 
which I have prepared for Judge Wahlquist's signature, 
encompassing his ruling at Court this morning, along with 
copies of the Motion for Continuance and Order. Judge 
Wahlquist continued the Order in Supplemental Proceedings which 
was served upon you for three weeks, until April 13, 1988. It 
wasn't until I stopped by your office and talked to your 
secretary after court that I found out that you were going to 
be in New York on April 13th. I shall ask Judge Wahlquist to 
continue the supplemental proceedings again for one week until 
April 20th, if that date is all right with you. 
I made my complaints in court this morning about the 
plaintiff's having the judgment entered without notifying us, 
and then a month later proceeding to tie up the corporate bank 
accounts. I made a "Rule 60" motion for relief from the 
judgment that was entered on February 2nd. Judge Wahlquist 
said that it was apparent to him that whoever lost at trial 
would want to appeal, and so there was a real prejudice in the 
plaintiff not notifying us of the entry of judgment, and so 
judgment would be re-entered as of today so that we could file 
a motion for new trial and/or appeal. 
OAHICL L. SCRMAN 
PATRICIA A. O'RORKE 
OOUGLAS J . • • A * * * 
SAMUEL O OAUDN 
*CGOY A. TOM3IC 
BLAKE S ATKIN 
JESSE C THCNTAOUC 
Allen Lipman, President 
March 23, 1988 
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Very t r u l y ycrurs, 
Edward J , McDonafugh 
